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Abstract
In this paper we model the interaction between parties and candidates to highlight
the mechanisms by which parties selecting candidates may discipline legislators. Parties
are long-lived institutions providing incentives to short-lived candidates. Citizens have
preferences over a multimentional policy space comprising an ideological and a monetary
dimension. Candidates are policy motivated on the ideological dimension only and have
opposing interest with respect to citizens on the monetary dimension. Policy motivation
implies that candidates care more about winning elections the bigger the ideological dis-
tance from the candidate of the opponent party. Therefore, parties can use strategically
polarization to provide incentives to candidates. Because of this strategic use, the polar-
ization of the political race may diverge from the polarization of voters’ preferences.I n
general, the polarization of the political race is a compromise between policy preferences
of party members and electoral goals. Finally, when parties converge to the median voter,
electoral accountability is inevitably compromised.
JEL codes: D70, D72, D78, D62
keywords: parties, polarization, elections, accountability, convergence, voting
Corresponding address: Royal Holloway University of London, Economics Depart-
ment, Egham Surrey, TW20 0EX, United Kingdom. Email: cecilia.testa@rhul.ac.uk
∗I wish to thank Tim Besley, Francesco De Sinopoli, Giovanni Facchini, Alan Hamlin, Giovanna Iannantuoni,
Gilat Levy, Ben Lockwood, Michael Mandler and all the participants of the Annual Meeting of the North
American Econometric Association (Evanston, 2003), the SAET (Rodhos, 2003), the Public Economics Seminar
at University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign, September 2003), the internal seminar series at Royal Holloway
University of London (October 2003), the Industrial Economics Workshop at University Carlos III (Madrid,
November 2003), for useful comments and suggestions. Remaining errors are only mine.1. Introduction
Parties are organizations acting as political intermediaries between candidates and citizens1.A s
such parties accomplish many important functions. First, they select candidates. Second, they
c a np r o v i d ei n f o r m a t i o no nc a n d i d a t e sa n dm o n i tor the performance of elected politicians2.I n
this way parties may discipline legislators and have a chance to inﬂuence policies. In this work
we do not challenge the view that parties are necessary to select and discipline candidates.
Indeed starting from the observation that in all modern democracies parties perform those
functions, we ask whether they are eﬃcient in accomplishing those tasks, i.e. whether they
choose candidates serving the interests of their constituents. Therefore this paper, modelling
the interaction between parties and candidates, develops a formal analysis of the candidate
selection process as a tool to control elected oﬃcials.
The question of the control of elected politicians is a typical delegation problem. Party
members select candidates and constituents vote for candidates to whom they delegate the
selection of the policy. When candidates are policy motivated, parties and citizens know that
the winner of the electoral race will implement his most preferred policy3. However, whenever
candidates are not purely policy-motivated, policies may be contractible and policy outcomes
depend on incentives faced by legislators. We can illustrate a typical delegation problem with
some examples. Consider a public policy that has two dimensions, an ideological dimension
and a monetary dimension. The ideological dimension can be represented by the rules to follow
in the provision of goods often provided by the state such as health or education4,a n dt h e
monetary dimension is the total cost of provision, paid by the citizens through taxes. Suppose
that individuals are policy motivated on the ideological dimension only. This implies that
this dimension is ﬁxed and determined by their ideology. On the other hand, the monetary
dimension is not ﬁxed and the politicians’ choice will depend on the incentives they will face.
For example, if private ﬁrms are involved in various ways in the provision of these goods, they
could lobby the incumbent legislator to set an high cost of provision and share the beneﬁts.
Or, alternatively if a policy can be realized at a low cost, but the legislator can divert money
1Often parties originate as associations of citizen bounded together by ideological concerns. The political
science literature on parties goals is vast. For a brief overview on the goals of political parties see J. A.
Schlesinger (1975).
2On the informational rationale for political parties see Caillaud-Tirole [2002] and Snyder-Ting [2000] .
3Policy-motivated candidates cannot commit to choose policies that do not reﬂect their preferences (Alesina,
1988).
4Examples of these rules can be universal versus restricted access, diﬀerent procedures to regulate the access
to the service , diﬀerent allocations of total speding to diﬀerents aspects of the service, etc.
2from the public funding to his pocket, then the legislator may choose a high level of taxes
and capture the monetary surplus from the realization of the low cost policy. Finally, it could
happen that the low cost policy requires a high level of eﬀort from the legislator , while for a
high cost project less eﬀort is required. In this case, again the legislator can gain from choosing
the high cost policy. In all these examples, the politician faces incentives inducing a policy
against the interests of the constituents.
In this paper we show how parties help voters to solve this accountability problem. Parties
are ideological and want to win elections in order to implement their ideological line. Candi-
dates also seek for reelection for ideological reasons, however their interests diverge from those
of parties and voters on non-ideological stances (such as the monetary dimension) that generate
private beneﬁts for the politician. Hence candidates may be willing to compromise reelection
to obtain private beneﬁts. In this framework we show that purely ideological parties using
only their candidate selection strategy may be able to ﬁnally bring to power accountable leg-
islators. Hence our paper shows that parties are an eﬀective institutional device for electoral
accountability even though they have limited instruments (candidate selection) and only care
about a subset of the policy space (ideology).
The outline of the model is as follows. Citizens have preferences over a two-dimensional
policy space comprising an ideological and a monetary dimension. Preferences on the ideolog-
ical dimension are single-picked and citizens to the left and right of the median voter belong
respectively to the left and right party. Parties select candidates for the electoral race. In
particular, each median party member puts forward one candidate. Candidates are policy mo-
tivated on the ideological dimension only. The monetary dimension of the policy is the cost
that is paid by all the citizens through non-distortionary taxation. The cost can be high or low.
Any policy can be implemented at a low cost, but the legislator can arbitrarily decide to set
a high cost that generates a private beneﬁt for himself. A legislator obtaining private beneﬁts
hurts the interests of the citizens and hence can loose elections. Therefore, the question arises
of how citizens - as voters and party members - can ﬁnd mechanisms to discipline candidates.
Party members are interested in accountable candidates because they can enhance the electoral
prospects of future party candidates. Hence parties pursuing their primary long term objective
(control of the ideological dimension of the policy), can provide incentives to legislators to forgo
private beneﬁt and seek for the election of their future nominees. In particular, since legislators
are policy motivated on the ideological dimension of the policy , they care more about the
election of their party’s nominee the bigger the ideological distance from the candidate of the
opponent party. Therefore parties, shaping the political race, can control the behavior of the
3incumbent legislator.
The main insight from this analysis is that parties determine the polarization of the political
race and they can use strategically polarization to provide incentives to candidates. Because of
this strategic use of candidate polarization we obtain that the polarization of voters’ preferences
and the polarization of the political race do not necessarily go in the same direction. For a
medium degree of polarization, the political race tends to reﬂect the polarization of preferences
but for more extreme distributions we can obtain diﬀerent results. Hence for example, when
the polarization of preferences is low, parties may choose to increase the polarization of the
political race in order to provide incentives toc a n d i d a t e s . A sac o n s e q u e n c em e d i a np a r t y
members can select candidates that are more extreme then themselves. On the other hand,
if the polarization of preferences is high, median party members may choose more moderate
candidates than themselves. Hence, the candidates will not necessarily represent the preferences
of either of the median party members nor of the median voter. In general, the polarization of
the political race turns out to be a compromise between policy preferences of party members
and electoral goals as parties use polarization strategically to provide incentives to candidates.
Finally, when parties converge to the median voter, accountability on the monetary dimension
is inevitably compromised.
This paper contributes to several streams of literature on delegation, accountability and
political parties. First, the delegation problem in political games as been widely studied by
agency models of political competition (Banks and Sundaram (1997), Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (1997), Coate and Morris (1995)). However, those models abstract from parties
and consider the question of the incentives as provided by voters only. We also consider the
incentives provided by voters, but those incentives are analyzed in a game that also includes
parties. The introduction of parties with their own internal process of candidates selection
is the main contributions of this paper5, that identiﬁes precisely in the candidate choice the
major mechanism by which parties as long-lived institutions can provide incentives to short-
lived candidates. In this sense, this paper relates to Alesina and Spear (1988) that show how
long-lived parties, making transfers to short-lived candidates, can prevent them from choosing
policies detrimental to parties’ interests. However, while in Alesina and Spear the role of
parties is to make transfers, in our model the institutional role of a party is only to guarantee
the existence of a mechanism of candidate choice that always select a candidate with certain
5Agency models typically assume that voters are identical as the heterogeneity of voters will make intractable
the informational problem. In our model, indeed we simplify the informational structure (actions and types are
observable) to focus on the heterogeneity of voters’ preferences that translates into diﬀerent party locations.
4ideological preferences, and we show that this is suﬃcient to discipline short-lived politicians.
Our view of parties as long-lived organizations providing incentives to short-lived candidates is
also similar the concept of ﬁrms as long-term organizations employing short-term workers. The
incentive problem for parties is very similar to the problem faced by ﬁrms that try to motivate
workers. In the spirit of this literature, cooperation of short-term agents can be enforced when
t h eg a m ei sr e p e a t e d 6. In our model, incumbents that cannot re-run for oﬃce are similar
to old member of organizations about to retire as in Cr´ emer (1989). However, contrary to
Cr´ emer (1989) we do not need overlapping generations since in our model the cooperation
of an incumbent in his last term7 is possible because after he leaves oﬃce, his own interests
as a citizen will be still linked to the interest of the party through the ideological dimension
of the policy (externality argument). Hence, provided that the politician lives at least one
period after retiring from oﬃce, he can act in the interest of the organization in order to enjoy
future ideological reward for his current policy choice as in Harrington (1992b). However, the
focus of our paper is substantially diﬀerent from Harrington (1992), since beside the ideological
dimension, we introduce a contractible dimension on which an agency problem arises.
This paper also contributes to the vast literature on party convergence initiated by the sem-
inal work of Downs (1957). The most celebrated result of convergence to the median voter in a
model of spatial competition where parties only care about winning elections is diﬃcult to rec-
oncile with stylized facts. Hence, several theoretical explanations for party platform divergence
have been proposed (Robertson (1976), Wittman(1983),Palfrey (1984), Calvert (1985), Bern-
hardt and Ingberman (1985), Londregan and Romer (1993) Ingberman and Villani (1993)).
In particular, Alesina (1988) shows that when parties care about policies, non-convergence to
the median voter is possible. In our model we show that non-convergence may also arise in
a multidimensional policy space with perfect information. Furthermore, we show that non-
convergence is necessary to obtain electoral accountability. Importantly and contrary the case
of unidimensional policies, we show that when the policy is multidimensional, party polariza-
tion is not necessarily ”bad” for the median voter. Indeed in our model we ﬁnd that the median
voter may prefer some degree of party polarization on the ideological dimension of the policy
when this leads to accountability on the contractible dimension. Hence, our model on one hand
provides a further explanation for the recognized non-convergence paradox, on the other shows
that some degree of party diﬀerentiation on ideological issues may indeed be desirable as long
6For a survey on the repeated game literature, see for example, R. Aunmann, 1989, Survey of repeated
games, in Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honour of Oskar Morgenstern.
7the equivalent of the oldest member of the organization in Cr´ emer (1989).
5as this may bring accountability on non-ideological stances. In this way our works builds a
bridge between agency models of political competition and the literature on party competition,
showing how parties competing for elections may help voters to obtain accountable legislators.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we outline the model. In section 3 we
discuss the main assumptions and we present an intuitive argument for the proof of the main
results. In section 4 we solve the model and state the main propositions. In section 5 we discuss
the results. In section 6 we summarize and conclude.
2. The model
2.1. Policy and preferences
The economy consists of inﬁnitely lived citizens denoted k = i, that delegate to a legislator
denoted k = j the selection of a public policy. The legislator is a particular citizen, appointed to
make policy choices for a limited number of periods, which becomes again an ordinary citizen
when his mandates expires8. More formally, in this economy citizens live t periods where t
belongs to the inﬁnite set T = {0,1,2,3....} and for simplicity we assume that a legislator j
can stay in place for one period only.
The policy is multidimensional and consists of an ideological dimension that we call type




, with CH >C L, the per capita cost paid by the citizens. The policy can
always be implemented at a low cost, CL. However, in each period the legislator has complete
discretion on whether to set the high or the low cost. The type of the policy is a characteristic
on which individuals have diﬀerent tastes. We denote xi the most preferred policy type of
individual i and we suppose that there is a continuum of citizens distributed according to their
most preferred policy type .W ed e n o t eM the median voter of this distribution9 that is assumed
to be symmetric with respect to M. Hence, the median voter M splits the population in two
groups of equal size according to their ideological preferences and these two groups constitute
the two parties labelled respectively L and R. Therefore, parties in this model are associations
8This assumption reﬂects the idea that that elected oﬃcials know the date of their last mandate because of
term limits or retirement age. Note however that as elections and policy choices go far beyond the last mandate
of elected politicians, citizens face uncertainty about the last period where they will participate to an election
or the policy will be delivered. Or put it diﬀerently, their time horizon is inﬁnite. We will discuss later in the
paper the relevance of this assumption.
9We are assuming that preferences of the individuals on the ideological dimension are single picked, hence
citizens i can be ranked according to their most preferred policy type, xi.
6of citizens bound together by ideological concerns10. Given each party, we denote mR and mL
the median party members of respectively party R and party L .
The two median party members select the two candidates for the electoral race11.T h e
median voter M,voting for one of the two nominated candidates, appoints the legislator. Finally,
the appointed policy maker during his mandate chooses the public policy.
We assume that policy makers are policy motivated on the ideological dimension. This
means that once in oﬃce a legislator j chooses his most preferred policy type xj . Therefore,
the policy choice is a vector (C,xj). We also assume that party members are ideological in
the sense that they attach higher weight to the ideological dimension than to the monetary
dimension of the policy. In other words, they care more about a subset of the policy space.
Several observations justify this assumption. First, party charts typically specify only the
party objectives on some speciﬁc issues. Second, it is widely recognized that party activists are
particularly ”ideological” i.e. they tend to have an exclusive interests over some dimension of the
policy space. This characteristics of parties may cast doubts on the ability of those institutions
to actually promote voters interests on a wider policy spectrum. Hence, it is important to
understand if the ideological leaning of parties may actually compromise their ability to select
candidates serving the electorate’s general interests. As we will show, in our model this is not
the case, since parties because of strategic considerations also inﬂuence other policy dimensions
to which they attach low or even no weight.
We deﬁne |xk − xj| the ideological distance between a generic individual citizen k and a
legislator j .T h e m e d i a n v o t e r M suﬀers an ideological loss from the policy type equal to
−|xM − xj| and pays the percapita cost C. The legislator j obtains an ideological beneﬁt12
and pays the cost C, but he also receives a private beneﬁt B (C)t h a ti si n c r e a s i n gi nh i s






= B>C H. Party
members also obtain an ideological loss as citizens do, and they dislike the cost that enters in
their utility function with a weight α,w h e r e0≤ α ≤ 1. When α = 1, party members dislike
the cost exactly as any other citizen. On the other hand, when α =0 ,p a r t ym e m b e r sa r e
purely ideological since they do not care about the cost of the policy.
10We assume the existence of parties. In other words, this is not a model of party formation but a more
simple model of party strategy. Once formed parties are relatively stable institutions that can generate diverse
candidate locations due to their internal democratic processes. Therefore, the focus of this paper is precisely
on the eﬀects of these internal mechanism of candidate selection on ﬁnal policy outcomes.
11This feature of the model is meant to represent a democratic process of candidate selection inside the party.
T h el o g i co ft h em o d e la n dt h em a i nr e s u l t sw i l lg ot h r o u g hi ft h ec a n d i d a t es e l e c t i o nw i l lb em a d eb ys o m e
other party member because of a diﬀerent allocation of voting right inside the party in the nomination process.
12His ideological loss is zero since he choses his most preferred policy.
7Therefore, given the ideological distance, |xk − xj|, the cost C and the private beneﬁt
B(C),the per-period utility for the median voter M, the median party members, mL and mR,
and legislator j can be written as follows:
vM (C,xj)=−|xM − xj| − C (2.1)
vmL (C,xj)=−|xmL − xj| − αC (2.2)
vmR (C,xj)=−|xmR − xj| − αC (2.3)
vj (C,xj)=B (C) − C (2.4)
Timing and strategies
The timing of the game is as follows. Initially there is a nomination process and one
party’s nominee is exogenously selected to become the ﬁrst legislator. The nomination process
works in the following way. In period t = 0, the two median party members, knowing which
party’s nominee will be the ﬁrst exogenously selected legislator, announce simultaneously their
candidates. The selection of candidates happens once and for ever during t =0 ,b e f o r et h eﬁrst
election13. This means that in t = 0 median party members decide the ideological position of
all future party’s candidates14. Hence, even if a legislator can stay in power for one period only,
given the candidate selection process, he will always be replaced by a candidate with identical
ideological preferences in any future electoral race . More formally, each median party member
13The fact that the candidate choice only happens in period t = 0, only means that in the future the candidates
will be of the ”type” intially chosen, not that they will be the same individuals. The selection of the type in
t = 0, is a stylized representation of the the ideological party position adopted in the party constitution.
14As we consider a stationary environment, once party members choose optimally their candidates in the
ﬁrst period, they will not ﬁnd optimal to change this choice later on even if they where allowed to reselect
their candidates. Hence, under stationarity with no loss of generality, we carry on our analysis with candidate
selection in the ﬁrst stage only.
8selects once and for ever at the beginning of the game a candidate within his own party 15.
We denote ΓmL and ΓmR the strategies of the two party members prescribing the selection of a
candidate party member at the beginning of the game.
The appointed legislator chooses a policy in t = 0 and later on elections are called. In period
t =1t h eﬁrst election takes place and the median voter decides which candidate to appoint.
He can either appoint the candidate of the incumbent’s party or he can appoint the opponent.
The winner of the electoral competition becomes the new legislator who will choose the policy
in period t = 1. Then again at the beginning of period t = 2 a new election will take place and
the elected legislator choose the policy in period t = 2 and so on. More formally, in each period
t ≥ 1w eh a v ea nelection followed by a policy choice. T h i si st h estage game repeated for t
periods. The players of this repeated game are the median voter M and the legislator j.A tt h e
e n do fe a c hp e r i o dt they observe each others actions. The action space for the median voter
is the set of all possible voting decisions 16, and the action space for the legislator is the set of
all possible policy choices17.L e tht and et denote respectively the history of past policy choices
and the history of past electoral outcomes up to the period t observed by all players. Then for
each player, we can deﬁne a strategy that in each period maps all possible histories into actions.
We denote σt
Mj(ht,e t) the median voter’s strategy that in every period t prescribes whether to
elect or not the candidate of the incumbent legislator’s party, given the history of past policy
choices and past electoral outcomes18. Similarly, we denote ct
j (ht,e t) the legislator’s strategy
that in period t prescribes a policy (Ct,x jt), given the history of electoral outcomes and policy
choices.
Payoﬀs
The outcome of the game induced by the strategies of the players is a sequence of legislators
and policies denoted pt ,w h e r e{pt =[ jt,(Ct,x jt)]}
∞
t=t+1 . The total intertemporal payoﬀ of
each player is the sum of their per period utility, where the future is discounted according to








payoﬀ in period t of the generic player k.L e tvk (pt) be the utility the individual k associated to






.T h eintertemporal payoﬀ
of each player can be written in the following form:
15The set of candidates for each party coicides with his onw party members.
16The possible voting decisions are to vote for the candidate of the incumbent’s party or to vote for the
opponent.




























The players of this game maximise their total intertemporal payoﬀs. We require the can-
didate choice be a Nash equilibrium of the one shot game where median party members select
candidates. For the voting and policy rules in the repeated game, we require the equilibrium
voting rule and the equilibrium policy to be subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We restrict
our analysis to pure strategies.
We deﬁne the equilibrium of this game as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. A political equilibrium consists of the following elements:
(a) pair of candidate that are best response to each other, given the equilibrium voting
strategy and the equilibrium policy choice
(b) a voting strategy and a policy choice that are subgame perfect
To summarize, a political equilibrium consists in a pair of candidates appointed by the two
parties to participate to the political race, in an equilibrium voting strategy for the citizens that
elect the legislator and in an equilibrium policy chosen by the legislator .
3. Policy preferences, political salience and party loyalty
The median party member selects the candidate, while the median voter determines the result
of the election. The median voter unambiguously prefers a low cost policy to an high cost
policy. On the other hand, in terms of ideology he prefers a candidate that is as close as
possible to himself. Ideally, a median voter would prefer a median candidate type choosing a
low cost policy since his most preferred policy is
¡
xM,CL¢
. On the other hand, a median party
member would like to have his own most preferred policy type implemented for ever. To do so,
he needs the support of the median voter. Clearly, when the low cost policy has been chosen,
the candidate of the incumbent’s party is more likely to be elected by the median voter. Note
that, even when median party members do not care directly for the cost of the policy (i.e.
α = 0), still their intertemporal payoﬀ depends on the cost of the policy because of electoral
considerations. Hence our main goal is to verify if electoral considerations are suﬃcient to
10induce median party members to select candidates that will be accountable on the monetary
dimension.
We can provide a simple intuition for how we will proceed to characterize an equilibrium
with accountable legislators. An incumbent choosing a high cost policy obtains a private beneﬁt
B. Since he can stay in oﬃce only for one mandate, he can eventually obtain this private beneﬁt
for one period only . On the other hand, he obtains the maximum ”ideological” beneﬁtc h o o s i n g
the policy. Furthermore, after his mandate expires, he can still obtain a maximum ideological
beneﬁt provided that his party nominee ( whose ideological preferences are the same of the
incumbent) will win elections.
Therefore, we can note here a striking diﬀerence between the private beneﬁt from the policy
and the ideological beneﬁt. A candidate can enjoy private beneﬁts only during the limited
number of political mandates he can serve19, on the other hand he receives the ideological
beneﬁt (loss) for the rest of his life after he leaves oﬃce and this beneﬁt will be maximum if
a legislator of his own party will be in oﬃce. Clearly, if opponent party wins elections, then
incumbents will suﬀer an electoral loss that will be higher the bigger the ideological distance
between the candidates of the two parties. This ideological loss can be interpreted as the cost
to an incumbent of future electoral defeats of his own party.
Because of the ideological loss, an incumbent whose political mandate cannot be renewed
may still have an interest to enhance the electoral prospect of his own party. Hence, he may
be willing to give up the private beneﬁt from the policy to guarantee the electoral success
of his party’s nominees in future elections. In our model, this outcome is possible when the
median voter is willing to reward (punish) with election (no election) the candidate of the
incumbent’s party when the incumbent has chosen the low cost (high cost), i.e. when the
cost of the policy is politically salient20. Hence, the possibility to discipline an incumbent on
the monetary dimension of the policy relies on two factors: (a) the existence of a credible
reward/punishment mechanism a n d( b )t h es i z eo ft h eideological loss. The reward/punishment
mechanism is the voting rule adopted by the median voter M. The ideological loss depends
on the distance between the candidates of the two parties, i.e. the polarization of the political
19In our model for simplicity we report the results with one mandate, however all the results hold for any
other ﬁnite number of mandates.
20Clearly, since the policy is multidimensional, the political equilibrium depends crucially on the salience of the
two issues. Formally, the cost of the policy is politically salient when the following holds: |xM − xj|+CL ≤ CH.
In words, the inequality says that the median voter M prefers a legislator j choosing the low cost policy to a
legislator M choosing the high cost policy. Note that, with a continuum of types, there is always a candidate
j 6= M but close enough to M, so that the previous inequality holds. However, this candidate j needs not to be
the median party member.
11race. We can immediately note that if the two parties would converge to the median voter
M, than an incumbent will never suﬀer an ideological loss being replaced by an ”identical”
challenger. Therefore, if a political equilibrium where the incumbent is accountable on the
monetary dimension exists, in this equilibrium parties must not converge to the median voter.
In the next sections we will characterize the political equilibrium in two steps. First, we will
show that there is a credible reward/punishment voting rule that the median voter can adopt
toward the incumbent. Second, given this credible punishment/reward rule, we will show there
are cases where parties, choosing candidates, do not converge to the median voter. In some
of these non-convergent locations, incumbents are accountable on the monetary dimension of
the policy. Hence we show how parties, as long lived institutions, can use strategically their
location on the ideological stance so as to provide incentives to short-lived candidate to forgo
current private beneﬁt in order to avoid future ideological losses.
4. Political equilibrium
4.1. Voting rule and policy choice
At the beginning of the game one of the two parties’ nominee is exogenously selected to become
the ﬁrst legislator. Without loss of generality suppose that the ﬁrst incumbent legislator j
belongs to party L and his challenger j0 belongs to party R. As all future nominees of a party
share the same ideological preferences, for simplicity we will call ”incumbent type” all future
nominees of the incumbent’s party. In terms of ideological location, the two candidates can
be either symmetric with respect the median voter M or asymmetric. We can summarize the
possible candidates locations in three cases:
• case 1: the challenger j0 is closer to the median voter then the incumbent j. For simplicity,
let’s assume that j0 = M 6= j
• case 2: the incumbent j is closer to the median voter then the challenger j0. For simplicity,
let’s assume that j = M 6= −j
• case 3: the incumbent j and the challenger j0 are equally distant from the median voter.
We illustrate in detail how to solve the game in case 1. Then the same logic will be used for
the other two cases. Remember that we are interested in an equilibrium where the incumbent
legislator chooses the low cost policy, i.e. he is accountable to voters on the monetary dimension.
The incumbent legislator j 6= M chooses the policy maximising his total intertemporal
payoﬀ. He chooses his most preferred policy type xj w h i l ei np o w e ra n dt h e nh er e s i g n s .
12However if in the following period his party’s nominee is elected, the incumbent legislator j
will obtain again his most preferred policy type. Hence, the appointment of the incumbent’s
party nominee can be seen as a ”reward” for the past incumbent’s policy choice, and the
replacement with the challenger as a ”punishment”. The median uses his voting strategy
to reward or punish the incumbent for his decision on the cost dimension. However, since
the policy is multidimensional, a reward/punishment scheme contingent on the cost is not
necessarily optimal when the incumbent has ideological preferences diﬀerent from the median
voter. On one hand the median voter would like to reward the incumbent’s party nominee to
obtain the low cost policy, on the other he may be tempted to replace him with a challenger
with closer ideological preferences. Since punishments and rewards may be costly to carry on
we need to verify that they are credible, or put it diﬀerently, subgame perfect.
We can represent this game with a game three where in each period t a legislator decides
whether to choose CL or CH and the identity of the legislator at each decision node from period
t =1o n w a r dc a nb ee i t h e rj = M or j 6= M, depending on the equilibrium voting strategy of
the median voter M.
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Figure 1 - game tree (a)
13Suppose that the median voter M follows the strategy ”reappoint the incumbent type j if
j has chosen the low cost policy, appoint the challenger j0 if the incumbent j has chosen the
high cost policy”. We have to prove that punishment and reward are sub-game perfect. We can
easily prove the subgame perfection of the punishment:
Lemma 1. Suppose that in t =1there are two candidates j 6= M and j0 = M where j is the
incumbent type and j0 is the challenger, then the voting strategy prescribing to not elect the
incumbent type j if the incumbent j has ever chosen CH in the past, is an equilibrium voting
strategy.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that, given this equilibrium voting strategy, in the ﬁrst mandate an incumbent leg-
islator j choosing the high cost policy, is permanently replaced by the challenger M.A l s o ,
from second mandate onward the legislator M will always choose the high cost policy, since he
cannot be punished for this. Hence, we can conclude that from period t =1o n w a r dt h ep o l i c y
(CH,x M)w i l lb ec h o s e n .G i v e nlemma 1, we can illustrate our game with the following ﬁgure.
It is useful to call Gt the game starting after any deviation from the low cost policy. Since we
know the solution to the game Gt,w ec a ne a s i l yc o m p u t et h ep a y o ﬀ of each player in this game.
I nt h eg a m et h r e eo ft h eﬁgure 2, the bold line illustrates the equilibrium path whenever the
incumbent j chooses the high cost policy:
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Figure 2 - game tree (b)
Let’s consider now the part of the game three following the low cost policy. The argument
proving sub-game perfection of the reward for the low cost policy is more subtle. The credi-
bility problem of future rewards comes from the fact that the median voter M is closer to the
challenger j0 = M than to the incumbent j 6= M on the ideological dimension. Hence, once
the incumbent has chosen the low cost policy, the median voter may be tempted to replace the
incumbent type with the challenger.
To prove that re-election is credible, we ﬁrst conjecture that rewarding the incumbent type
with reelection if the incumbent has chosen CL is an equilibrium voting strategy, and then we
show that, under some parametric restrictions this conjecture is correct. In particular, we can
p r o v et h a tf o rt h em e d i a nv o t e ri ti so p t i m a lt ov ote according to this conjecture, provided that
this conjectured voting strategy induces the incumbent to choose the low cost policy.
Assume that the conjectured voting strategy, denoted σ∗
Mj(.) for the incumbent with respect
to the median voter decision is ”reappoint the incumbent type j if j has always chosen CL in
the past and replace the incumbent type j with the challenger j0 if j he has ever chosen CH
in the past”.
15The next lemma state the conditions under which the incumbent in t =0 ,g i v e nt h ec o n -
jectured voting strategy σ∗
Mj(.)ﬁnds optimal to choose the low cost .
Lemma 2. Given the candidates M and j , the conjectured voting strategy σ∗
Mj(.) and any
future policy sequence chosen by successive legislators, in period t =0the incumbent legislator





if and only if |xj − xM| ≥ B
δ
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively the lemma says that if the future ideological beneﬁtf r o mt h el o wc o s tp o l i c y
δ|xj − xM| is higher than the current private beneﬁtl o s sB, then the ﬁrst incumbent chooses
the low cost policy. Importantly, the future ideological beneﬁtd e p e n d so nt h epolarization of
the political race, i.e. the ideological distance between the incumbent j and the challenger M.
Given the stationarity of the game, this result holds for any incumbent legislator in place for
the ﬁr s tt i m ea ta n yp e r i o dt.
F i n a l l y ,w ec a np r o v et h a tu n d e rt h es a m ep a r a m e t r i cr e s t r i c t i o n so flemma 2, the conjec-
tured voting strategy is an equilibrium voting strategy:
Lemma 3. Suppose that in t =1there are two candidates j 6= M and j0 = M,w h e r ej
is the incumbent and j0 is the challenger and assume that the cost is politically salient, i.e.
|xM − xj| + CL <C H.I f|xj − xM| ≥
β
δ,then the voting strategy prescribing to elect the
incumbent type j if j h a sa l w a y sc h o s e nCLin the past, is an equilibrium voting strategy.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, when the conjectured strategy implies an equilibrium where the incumbent j is
accountable in every period, for the voter it is optimal to vote accordingly since if he doesn’t,
in any future period accountability will be lost. Note that the assumption of political salience
is crucial to obtain this result, since when C is politically salient the median voter prefers an
equilibrium where j 6= M is accountable to an equilibrium where j = M is not accountable.
As a ﬁnal but important remark, the fact that the game is repeated is important. If the
game had a ﬁnal period, by backward induction we can easily show that the voter could not
credibly reward the incumbent for choosing the low cost policy and as a consequence the low
cost policy will never be chosen. Proceeding backward, in the ﬁnal period t, because no future
election will be called, any j legislator would choose the high cost policy. If this is the case, an
incumbent legislator in period t − 1, knows that the median voter will never ”reward” him for
choosing a low cost policy since he will certainly prefer the challenger M choosing CH to the
16successor j choosing CH. As a consequence, the incumbent j in t − 1w i l lc h o o s eCH. Hence,
proceeding backward up to period t = 0 we can conclude that the policy CH is the equilibrium
policy in every period t ≥ 0.
Having characterized the equilibrium of the repeated game when the two candidates are
asymmetric and the challenger is closer to the median voter than the incumbent (case 1), we
can now easily solve the repeated game in the other two cases where the incumbent is closer to
the median voter than the challenger (case 2) and where candidates are symmetric (case 3).
We can represent the game of case 2 with the following picture :
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Figure 3 - game tree (c)
Note that, the game starting after each deviation of the incumbent legislator M is identical
to the game we solved in case 1. Therefore, for the solution the same logic applies21.
Lemma 4 states the conditions for the incumbent legislator j = M to be accountable to
voters:
21We prove in the appendix that, when lemma 3 holds, the equilibrium voting strategy in case 2 coincide
with the equilibrium voting strategy σ∗
Mj(.)i nc a s e1 .
17Lemma 4. Given the candidates j = M and j0 6= M , the conjectured voting strategy σ∗
Mj(.)
and any future policy sequence chosen by successive legislators, the incumbent legislator M in





if and only if |xM − xj| ≥
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ .
Proof. the lemma is straightforward since we simply need to impose that the following











|xM − x−j| + CL¢
.
Note that, when the incumbent is j = M , the threshold level
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ ,i sb i g g e rt h a n
the threshold level we found in lemma 2 where the incumbent is j 6= M 22.
We conclude with case 3, where the candidates j and j0 are symmetric with respect to the
median voter. In this case the equilibrium voting strategy is the same as in the asymmetric
case where the incumbent is j 6= M and the challenger is j = M (case 1).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,t h e
condition insuring that the incumbent legislator will choose the low cost is the same of lemma
1 (proof in appendix).
4.2. Party location and accountability
In this section we show how parties can choose accountable candidates, given the credible
reward/punishment voting rule illustrated in the previous section. Since the most important
ingredient in the characterization of the political equilibrium is the polarization of the political
race, i.e. the ideological distance between the two parties’ candidates, the following deﬁnition
is useful to lay out the main results:
Deﬁnition 2. Let σMj(.) be a credible voting strategy that prescribes re-election of the incum-
bent type when the incumbent j has chosen the low cost and no re-election if the incumbent
has chosen the high cost policy. We deﬁne ”accountability threshold” the minimum ideological
distance between any incumbent j and any opponent j0, such that , given the voting strategy





Corollary 1. given any two candidates j and j0,t h eaccountability threshold is equal to
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ .
22This result is due to the fact that the incumbent M choosing CH is permanently replaced by the challenger
j choosing CL. Therefore, although the incumbent M in the future (as a citizen) will suﬀer a loss on the
ideological dimension, still on the monetary dimension he will get his most preferred policy CL.
18Proof. Proof: corollary 1 follows from deﬁnition 1 and lemmata 1-4.
Using now corollary 1 and deﬁnition 2 we can state the main results of the model. Re-
member that, when α < 1 party members care less than citizens about the cost of the policy.
Clearly, the less parties care for the cost of the policy, the more diﬃcult it is to obtain an
equilibrium where they select accountable legislators. In particular, the most diﬃcult case for
accountability arises when parties are purely ideological, i.e. α = 0. Hence, if we can show
that purely ideological parties can choose accountable candidates, then af o r t i o r ithe results of
the model will hold even for less ideological candidates. In the next proposition we prove how
purely ideological parties can select accountable legislators. The conditions we ﬁnd are then
necessary for accountability when α =0a n ds u ﬃcient for α > 0.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the party of the ﬁrst incumbent is L and the opponent is R.I f
the distance between the median party member mL and the median voter M is bigger or equal
than the ”accountability threshold”, then the party L runs the median party member mL,w i n s





in any period t ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The previous proposition characterizes the political equilibrium highlighting the role of
policy preferences. When the distance between the median party member and the median
voter is suﬃcient to induce the incumbent legislator mL to choose the low cost policy, then the
incumbent can be held accountable even if the opponent party would converge to the median
voter in his candidate choice! Hence, in this case the polarization of policy preferences has two
implications. The median party member will realize his most preferred policy. The median
voter will not receive his most preferred policy on ideological grounds but he will discipline the
incumbent on the monetary dimension of the policy.
If we assume that, although the cost is politically salient, the ideological distance between
the median party member of the incumbent party, mL, and the median voter, M,i sn o ts u ﬃcient
to guarantee accountability, then we obtain the following results:
19Proposition 2. Suppose that the party of the ﬁrst incumbent is L and the party of the oppo-
nent is R.L e tLC be the set of candidates j ∈ L more centrist than the median party member
mL and let RC be the set of candidates j0 ∈ R more centrist than the median party member mR.
Let jE1 be the ﬁrst extreme candidate such that | xjE1 − xM |= | xmL − xmR | and let’s deﬁne
the following threshold level for the discount rate, δj = |xmL−xj|
|xmL−xj0|, where j = {jE1,m L,j∈ LC}.
Suppose that the distance between the median party member mL and the median voter M is
strictly less than ”accountability threshold”. then the following holds:
• when the distance between the two median party members mL and mR is strictly bigger
than the ”accountability threshold” and δ < δjE1, then the party L runs the extreme
candidate jE1 and the opponent party R runs the median voter M. The candidate of the
incumbent party, jE1, chooses the low cost policy and wins the elections in every period
t ≥ 1.
• When the distance between the two median party members mL and mR is weakly smaller
than the ”accountability threshold” two cases arise. If δ > δj for every j ∈ LC,t h e n
party L runs the median party member mL, party R runs the most extreme candidate
in RC.T h ei n c u m b e n tmL chooses the high cost policy and looses the elections in every
period t ≥ 1. On the other hand, if δj < δ < δM for every j ∈ LC,t h e np a r t yL runs
j = M, party R runs j0 = M.T h ei n c u m b e n tM chooses the high cost policy and wins
the elections in every period t ≥ 1;
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, the proposition states that if the distance between the median party member of
the incumbent party, mL,a n dt h em e d i a nv o t e r ,M,i sn o ts u ﬃcient to guarantee accountability
because it is inferior to the accountability threshold , but the distance between the median party
member of the incumbent party, mL, and the median party member of the opponent party mR
is suﬃcient for accountability, then the party of the ﬁrst incumbent can delegate the policy
choice to a more extreme policy type than himself so as to obtain accountability. In other words,
when the opponent party locates his candidate on the median voter M, the incumbent party,
choosing a more extreme type than himself, can locate suﬃciently far away from the median
voter to obtain an accountable candidate. However, this is an optimal strategy provided that
the median party member is closer to the ﬁr s te x t r e m ec a n d i d a t et h a tg uarantees accountability
than to the median voter M.I n f a c t w h e n mL delegates to a more extreme candidate, he is
facing an ideological loss, although this will guarantee him to win the elections. Clearly if the
20median party member is closer to the median voter than to the extreme candidate, than for
him it is better to loose the election and have a median opponent in place than to win the
election with an extreme candidate. Geometrically, we can show that the when the distance
between the median party members is suﬃcient for accountability, then the distance between
the median party member and the ﬁrst extreme candidate that will be accountable is not bigger
than the distance from the median voter. Furthermore, the median party member could run
ac a n d i d a t emL, obtain his most preferred policy in one period and then be replaced for ever
by the opponent j0. Hence, for delegation to the more extreme jE1 to be optimal, it must be
that the median party member prefers to give up his most preferred policy in the ﬁrst period in
order to obtain in all future period the policy chosen by his candidate jE1 instead of the policy
of the opponent j0. When the distance between the median party members is either necessary
or not suﬃcient for accountability, than the median party member is closer to the median voter
than to the ﬁrst extreme candidate that will be accountable. Therefore, in this case, delegation
to a more extreme candidate to obtain accountability is never optimal. On the other hand,
when the median party member is closer to jE1 than to M, delegation to a more extreme is
optimal when δ suﬃciently small, i.e. , δ < δjE1 . If this is not the case, then either the party
of the ﬁrst incumbent prefers to run the median party member, obtain his most preferred policy
in one period and then be replaced by the opponent, or there is full convergence the median
voter M. In both cases , the high cost policy will be chosen23.
Finally, let’s consider the following case. Suppose that the distance between the median
party member mL and the median voter M is such that if mL ,choosing the low cost policy,
could be reelected, then he would prefer to choose the low cost policy and be in oﬃce instead of
obtaining the private beneﬁts and loose the possibility to determine the ideological dimension
of the policy. In other words, the incumbent legislator cares enough about the ideological
dimension to forgo private beneﬁts. However, suppose that, given the distance between mL
and M ,t h em e d i a nv o t e rM would rather prefer a median candidate choosing the high cost
policy than a the more extreme candidate mL choosing a low cost policy. In this example,
the distribution of preferences is such that the polarization is enough to provide incentives to
legislators but the distribution is too polarized for the median voter to reward a legislator for
choosing the low cost policy. Given this distribution of preferences, we can show the following
result:
23The characterization of the political equilibrium when δ > δjE1 is reported in appendix.
21Proposition 3. Suppose that the party of the ﬁrst incumbent is L and the opponent is R.
Assume that |xM − xmL|+CL >C H but there exist a more centrist candidate j ∈ LC such that
|xM − xj|+CL <C H .L e tjC1 be the ﬁrst centrist candidate such that |xM − xjC1|+CL <C H.
Let’s deﬁne the following threshold level for the discount rate, δC = |xmL−xjC1|
|xmL−xj0| . If the distance
between the candidate jC1 and the median voter M is bigger or equal than the accountability
threshold and δ < δC,t h e np a r t yL runs jC1 which chooses the low cost policy and beats any
opponent in every period t ≥ 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively the proposition says that if the median party member,mL,i s” t o of a r ”f r o mt h e
median voter, M, and there is a more centrist candidate jC1 that can guarantee accountability,
then the median party member prefers to delegate to the less extreme candidate. It is also
trivial to show that when δ does not satisfy the restriction required in proposition 3,w eo b t a i n
the same candidate locations described in proposition 2 (proof in appendix).
Using the main propositions, we can draw some conclusions on the link between distribution
of preferences and party location.F r o m proposition 1 we learn that, if the distance between
the median party member and the median voter is suﬃciently high to provide incentives to
legislators to forgo private beneﬁts in order to avoid ideological losses, then accountability can
be achieved. On the other hand, if the distance between the median party member and the
median voter is not enough to induce accountability, then the median party member may solve
the accountability problem choosing a more extreme policy type than himself. Hence, to gain
an everlasting control on the ideological dimension of the policy the median party member may
ﬁnd optimal to delegate the policy choice to a more extreme candidate. In this case we may
say that parties use polarization of candidates as a discipline device. However polarization as a
discipline device may work only if the median party member gains more from having in power
his candidate (although more extreme than himself) than he would from the candidate of the
opponent party member. In fact, if he is closer to the median voter than to the ﬁrst extreme
candidate that can guarantee accountability, then he would rather prefer the median candidate
of the other party than the extreme candidate of his own party (proposition 2). Finally, when
the preferences are very polarized so that the median voter is not willing to reelect the median
party member of the incumbent party, the incumbent party to win the elections is again willing
to sacriﬁce partly his ideological preferences choosing a less extreme candidate than himself.
225. Party competition and electoral discipline
Our model allows us to analyze the eﬀects of party competition on the two dimensions of the
policy. The main objective of parties is to obtain an ideological policy as close as possible to
the ideological preferences of the majority of the party members. The median party member
has the possibility to choose a candidate with his same preferences. However, as the control of
the ideological dimension of the policy over time depends on the elections, when parties choose
candidate they have also to consider the preferences of the median voter. The median voter
decides whether to reappoint an incumbent type nominee evaluating the incumbent’s policy
choice on the ideological dimension as well as on the monetary dimension. The salience of these
two dimensions is crucial for the equilibrium policy outcome. In particular, if the ideological
dimension is politically salient, the median voter will always obtain his most preferred type of
policy but he will always pay a high cost for it. In this case the party competition cannot help to
solve the accountability problem. On the other hand, if the monetary dimension of the policy
is politically salient, then the party competition c a nh e l pt odiscipline legislators. However,
the ability of the electoral mechanism to discipline legislators depends on the distribution of
preferences on the ideological dimension, as the distance between median party members and
median voter plays a crucial role in the determination of the political equilibrium.
Our theoretical framework also provides useful insight on the function of parties. In our
model, the role of a party as a long-lived institutions is to insure the selection of a precise type
of candidate, i.e. the implementation of a given ideology. Hence, even if candidates are short-
lived and cannot stay in place for ever, still because they are policy motivated on the ideological
dimension of the policy, they can be loyal to the party so as to obtain a candidate with their
same preferences in place (at least for one period) in the future. Therefore, we conclude that
party loyalty due to policy preferences is a key factor for legislators’ accountability. Note that
this mechanism of party discipline is very diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h em e c h a n i s mp r o p o s e db yA l e s i n a
and Spear (1988) where the role of parties, as long-lived institutions, is to make monetary
transfers to candidates after they leave oﬃce. Those transfers can be either pension payments
or, most often, career paths inside the administration associated with high monetary reward. In
other words, candidates loyal to the party are rewarded with positions ensuring high monetary
returns when they leave oﬃce. Therefore, de facto the role of parties is to make future monetary
transfers. In our model instead, the role of parties is to select ideologies that will be implemented
on the long term. Therefore, provided that candidates are policy motivated on those dimensions,
there is no need to make future monetary transfers to induce them to be loyal to the party,
23since their interests will be aligned with the party’s interests through the ideological dimension
of the policy.
Note also that although there is a similarity between parties and ﬁrms as long-lived orga-
nization that try to discipline short-lived agents, still parties are long-lived institutions with
a peculiar characteristic. As they determine the ideological dimension of the policy, which is
a non-monetary beneﬁt that former candidates receive even after they leave oﬃce, then par-
ties may be able to obtain cooperation from policy motivated incumbents even when their
mandate cannot be renewed, provided that the future ideological beneﬁt from cooperation is
bigger than the current private beneﬁts a c r i ﬁce. This mechanism of discipline is similar to
Harrington (1992b) where incumbents care about policy after they live oﬃce. However the
focus of our model is diﬀerent since the ideological location aﬀects electoral outcomes jointly
with the non-ideological dimension, on which parties have limited control. Hence, our paper on
one hand generalizes the party location problem to a multidimensional context. On the other
shows that, under certain distributions of policy preferences, even an agency problem arising
on non-ideological issues can be solved by party competition. Therefore, we conclude that some
degree of party diﬀerentiation on ideological issues is not only a characteristics often observed
in real world elections, but may indeed be a desirable property insofar as policy motivated
incumbents are more likely to be accountable to the electorate when they face the threat of
political rivals with substantially diﬀerent ideological agendas.
6. Conclusions
Parties are associations of citizens that play a fundamental role in representative democracies.
They are the primary actor of the electoral competition since they choose the candidates of the
political race. Furthermore, choosing candidates, parties may inﬂuence policies. Clearly, how
parties can actually aﬀect policies through the selection of candidates crucially depends on the
candidates preferences and on the relationship between parties and candidates.
In this paper we propose a model where legislators choose a multidimensional policy. We
assume that candidates are policy motivated on the ideological dimension of the policy but
they are not on the monetary dimension. In particular, a legislator can obtain private beneﬁts
from a policy that goes against the interests of the citizens on the monetary dimension. In
this set up, we show how parties as long lived institutions can provide incentives to short-lived
candidates to reject private beneﬁts and choose policies in the interests of the majority of their
constituents.
24The role of a party as a long-lived institutions is to insure the selection of a precise type
of candidate, i.e. the implementation of a given ideology. Hence, even if candidates are short-
lived and cannot stay in place for ever, still because they are policy motivated on the ideological
dimension of the policy, they can be loyal to the party so as to obtain a candidate with their
same preferences in place in the future. However, loyalty to the party is costly for incumbent
legislators, since in order to enhance the reelection of future nominees of their own party they
have to forgo private beneﬁts. Hence, an incumbent legislator is willing to forgo current private
beneﬁts for future ideology provided that the ideological gain is bigger than the beneﬁt loss. The
ideological gain depends on the ideological distance between the incumbent legislator and the
challenger of the opponent party, since the bigger the distance, the higher the loss from being
replaced by the challenger. As a consequence, parties can use strategically the polarization of
the political race to provide incentives to candidates.
The strategic use of party polarization implies that the polarization of preferences and the
polarization of the political race do not necessarily go in the same direction. In general, the
polarization of the political race turns out to be a compromise between policy preferences of
party members and electoral goals. Furthermore, party converge to the median voters is always
bad for accountability as ideologically identical candidates do not have incentives to reject
private beneﬁts.
This model is a further step toward the understanding of the role of political parties in
representative democracies. We propose a relatively simple model of party competition where
median party members select candidates and party polarization is the only instrument that
parties can use to provide incentives and win elections. However, parties can typically use
other instruments such as campaign spending to inﬂuence electoral outcomes. Also parties are
complex institutions that require consistent funding for their ordinary functioning. Transfers
from candidates to parties can be an important source of party ﬁnancing. Therefore, as money
seems to play an increasingly important role in politics, we may expect that parties may choose
their candidates looking not only to their ideological preferences but also at their ability to
obtain transfers from the private sector. Hence, the eﬀect of fund raising ability on the nomi-
nation process is an interesting question that goes beyond the scope of this paper but certainly
deserves further investigation.
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27Appendix
a) Equilibrium voting strategy
Lemma 1
Proof:
To prove lemma 1, let’s start with the part of the game three following CH in the t =0 .F i r s t ,w e
show that the voting rule ”replace the incumbent type with the challenger if he has chosen the high cost
policy” is an equilibrium voting strategy in t = 1. The argument proving this result goes as follows. In
period t = 0 the incumbent legislator j has chosen CH. When elections are called, the median voter
M will face a legislator j 6= M who has chosen the high cost policy and a challenger −j = M who
can choose any policy C ∈
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median voter can credibly carry on his threat and punish the incumbent.
Let’s continue now along the game three and let’s check if the same strategy is an equilibrium




, we know that in period t = 1 the incumbent will be













. In other words, he punishes the incumbent M
if he chooses CH . We can immediately show that in period t = 2, the voter cannot credibly punish
the incumbent M. The reason for this is that the two types of candidates, j and M, have both chosen
CH in the past, but M is closer to the median voter on ideological ground. By the same argument,
this is also an equilibrium voting strategy for any subsequent period t>1. Also, in our game three,
the strategy that prescribes to permanently replace the incumbent j 6= M with the challenger −j = M
whenever j chooses CH is an equilibrium voting strategy. Therefore we conclude that if in t =1t h e r e





=0i fj has ever chosen CH in the past, is an equilibrium voting strategy.
Lemma 4
To prove lemma 4, we consider all the possible candidates’ location (cases 1-3).










= 0 if the legislator j has ever chosen CH in the past;
is an equilibrium voting strategy for any j and j0.
• case 1
Let j 6= M be the incumbent legislator in t =0a n dl e t−j = M be the challenger. We show that
if (xj − xM) ≥
β




=0i ft h e
legislator j has ever chosen CH in the past, is an equilibrium voting strategy.




= 1 if the legislator j h a sa l w a y sc h o s e nCL in the past
28is an equilibrium voting strategy.
Suppose that this is not the case and suppose that after the legislator j has chosen CL in t =0 ,
the voter does not carry on his reward. If this happens, the equilibrium will permanently switch to
a legislator M choosing CH for ever. Hence, the payoﬀ for the median voter who does not reward a



















On the other hand, if the median voter carries on his reward, given that (xj − xM) ≥
β
δ,t h e



















|xM − xj| − CL)
therefore given the assumption of political salience the voter will prefer to carry on the reward in
t h es e c o n dm a n d a t e . I fw em o v et ot = 1, under the same parameter restrictions, we have exactly
t h es a m ep a y o ﬀs from carrying on the reward or deviating. Hence we conclude that the conjectured
voting strategy is an equilibrium voting strategy.
• case 2
Let j = M be the incumbent legislator in t =0a n dl e t−j 6= M be the challenger. We show that
claim 4 is true. The proof of the ﬁrst part of the conjecture is trivial since the median voter always
prefer a legislator j = M who chooses CL to any other legislator −j 6= M choosing any policy C.




=0 , if the legislator j has ever chosen CH in the past, note that
if the median voter does not carry on the punishment, then from t ≥ 1 onwards the equilibrium will
permanently be the incumbent j = M choosing CH. On the other hand, if lemma 5?? holds, i.e. if
(xM − x−j) ≥
β+δCH
δ , then carrying on the punishment, the equilibrium will be the incumbent j = M
choosing CL, hence clearly the median voter will prefer to carry on the punishment in t = 1. Hence
we conclude that the conjectured voting strategy is an equilibrium voting strategy.
•case 3
Let j be the incumbent legislator in t =0a n dl e t−jbe the challenger, where j and −j are
symmetric with respect to M. The following shows that claim 4 is true. The proof for the ﬁrst
part of the conjecture is trivial. Since the median voter is indiﬀerent between the two candidates
29on the ideological dimension, he cannot loose from carrying on his reward. Let’s consider now the




= 0 if the legislator j has ever chosen CH in the past.
This strategy prescribes to permanently replace the incumbent j with the opponent −j if ever the
incumbent deviates from the low cost policy. Note that the median voter is indiﬀerent between the
two candidates on the ideological dimension. Hence, the best strategy must be the voting strategy
that impliest the policy choice CL.T h ep o l i c yCL can be obtained punishing the incumbent with no
re-election.
b) Policy choice
The following proves lemma 2
Proof:
Assume that the conjectured voting strategy σ∗










= 0 if the legislator j has ever chosen CH in the past;
Remember the after any deviation from the low cost policy, the equilibrium path will represented
by the bold line in ﬁgure 2, where the high cost policy is chosen forever by the legislator M.G i v e n
this conjectured voting strategy, let’s compute the intertemporal payoﬀ of legislator j when he chooses
CL in t =0 . Since a deviation from the low cost policy may occur at any period t in the future, the
main diﬃculty in computing the intertemporal payoﬀ of the legislator choosing the low cost policy in
period t =0i st h ei n ﬁnite number of possible path associated to possible deviations in t ≥ 1. However,
among all the possibilities, we can identify the path that keeps the legislator j at his lowest possible
payoﬀ. Therefore, if we can ﬁnd a condition supporting the policy CL when the legislator obtains his
lowest payoﬀ, then this condition will guarantee that the legislator will choose CL also in any other
case where he can obtain a higher payoﬀ. We know that if he chooses CH his intertemporal payoﬀ









δt(|xj − xM| + CH)
If he chooses CL, his intertemporal payoﬀ will depend on the policy choice of future legislators.
Let’s denote V 0
j the lowest payoﬀ for the incumbent legislator j in t = 0, which is realized when the
incumbent chooses CL and his ﬁrst successor chooses CH . T h el o w e s tp a y o ﬀ for the incumbent in
t =0i s :
30V 1
j = −δCH −
∞ X
t=2
δt(|xj − xM| + CH)






j we obtain thatin period t = 0 the incumbent legislator




if and only if (xj − xM) ≥ B
δ ,which proves lemma 2. Finally note
that, since lemma 2 gives the condition for the legislator to be accountable in t = 0, given that the ﬁrst
successor will deviate in t = 1, then this condition will be suﬃcient for the legislator to be accountable
in t = 0 if deviation will occur at any other date t>1.
Proposition 1
Let j betheﬁrst incumbent and j0 the challenger. For party L, let’s deﬁne LC and LE the sets of the
centrist candidates and extreme candidates with respect to the median party member mL. Similarly,
.f o rp a r t yR, let’s deﬁne RC and RE the sets of the centrist candidates and extreme candidates with
respect to the median party member mR. Suppose that j ∈ L and j0 ∈ R. Let’s deﬁne n = 1
1−δ.
Given the assumption that (xmL−xM) ≥
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ , from lemmata 1-4, we know that the candidate
j = mL chooses the low cost policy and beats any opponent j0 in all future electoral rounds. Therefore,
the median party mL choosing a candidate j = mL obtains the maximum ideological payoﬀ (zero) for
ever. Suppose now that he chooses a candidate j 6= mL. Given the opponent j0,i f j wins the elections,
the median party member mL will obtain at most the payoﬀ V 0
ml = −n|xmL − xj| which is strictly
less than the maximum payoﬀ he obtains running the winning candidate mL. Hence, by iterated strict
dominance we can eliminate all the winning candidates j 6= mL. On the other hand if j looses the
election against j0, the median party member mL will obtains the payoﬀ V 0
ml = −n
¯ ¯xmL − xj0
¯ ¯ which
again is less then the maximum payoﬀ. Therefore, by iterated strict dominance we can eliminate all the
loosing candidates j 6= mL. Hence, j = mL is the only candidate location that survives iterated strict
dominance. On the other hand, the opponent median party member mR is indiﬀerent amongst all
candidate locations since for any candidate j
0
he will always obtain the payoﬀ V 0
mR = −n|xmR − xmL|.




wins against any candidate j0.
Proposition 2
Suppose that | xmL − xmR | is necessary for accountability, i.e. | xmL − xmR |=
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ .
F i r s tw ep r o v et h a tmL is closer to the median voter, M, than to the ﬁrst extreme party member
that guarantees accountability, jE1. In fact, if | xmL − xmR | is necessary for accountability, than for
jE1 to guarantee accountability it must be that:
31| xjE1 − xM |≥| xmL − xmR | (6.1)
we can show that inequality 6.1 implies that mL is closer to the median voter, M,t h a nt ojE1.
claim 1:w h e n| xjE1 − xM |=| xmL − xmR |,t h e n| xmL − xjE1 |=| xmL − xM |
p r o o fo fc l a i m1 : given a symmetric distribution, we have that
| xmL − xmR |=| xmL − xM | + | xmR − xM |
and
| xjE1 − xM |=| xmL − xM | + | xmL − xjE1 |
if | xjE1 −xM |=| xmL −xmR |,t h e n| xmL −xjE1 |=| xmR −xM | and by symmetry of the distribution
:
| xmL − xjE1 |=| xmR − xM |=| xmL − xM |
hence , | xmL − xjE1 |=| xmL − xM |
claim 2:i f| xjE1 − xM |>| xmL − xmR |,t h e n| xmL − xjE1 |>| xmL − xM |
p r o o fo fc l a i m2 : in fact, using the proof of claim 1 it is immediate to verify that:
| xmL − xjE1 |>| xmR − xM |=| xmL − xM |
hence we conclude that if | xjE1 − xM |≥| xmL − xmR | then | xmL − xjE1 |≥| xmL − xM |
(i.e. the median voter is closer to M than to jE1.)
The same logic applies when | xmL −xmR | is not suﬃcient for accountability,i.e. | xmL −xmR |<
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ . In this case for jE1 to guarantee accountability it must be that:
| xjE1 − xM |>| xmL − xmR |
hence with strict inequality the previous proof holds and we can conclude that again the median
party member is closer to the median voter than to the ﬁrst extreme accountable candidate.
32Similarly , if | xmL − xmR | is suﬃcient for accountability, i.e. | xmL − xmR |>
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ then
for jE1 to be accountable the following must be true:
| xjE1 − xM |≥
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ <| xmL − xmR |
therefore we can prove the following:
claim 3:i f| xjE1 − xM |≤| xmL − xmR |,t h e n| xmL − xjE1 |≤| xmL − xM |
p r o o fo fc l a i m3 : given a symmetric distribution, we have that
| xmL − xmR |=| xmL − xM | + | xmR − xM |
and | xjE1 − xM |=| xmL − xM | + | xmL − xjE1 |
hence, | xmL − xjE1 |≤| xmR − xM |=| xmL − xM |
therefore, the median party member is closer to the ﬁrst extreme accountable candidate than to
the median voter.
Using now claims 1-3,w ec a np r o v eproposition 2.
Assumption 1: |xmL − xmR| >
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ and |xmL − xM| ≤
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ and δ < |xmL−xjE1|
|xmL−xj0|
Let jE1 be the ﬁrst extreme candidate such that |xjE1 − xM| >
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ and lemmata 1-4 hold.
From assumption 1 and lemmata 1-4, the candidate location j = jE1 strictly dominates any other
extreme candidate location. Hence by iterated strict dominance we can eliminate any j 6= jE1 ∈ LE.
Let’s consider now the candidate j = mL and the set of the centrists candidates LC. The opponent
j
0
can be the median party member mR or an extreme RE or a centrist RC. First note that j
0
∈ RC
beats the incumbent j = mL . Therefore, the median party member of the incumbent party in this








¯ ¯ ¯xmL − xj
0
¯ ¯ ¯. On the other hand, j = mL beats j0 = mR,
therefore V 0









Let’s consider now the candidate j ∈ LC.I f j0 ∈ RC, then the median party member can get
















¯ ¯xmL − xj0
¯ ¯(w h e nj0 is closer to M than j).F i n a l l y ,j ∈ LC beats








1−δ |xmL − xj|.
Note that every j/ ∈ LE beats every j0 / ∈ RC.T h i si m p l i e st h a tj
0
/ ∈ RC is dominated by j0 ∈ RC .
Hence by iterated dominance we can eliminate j0 = mL and j0 ∈ RE.
Therefore, we are left with the following possible equilibrium locations:
(j = jE1,j= mL,j∈ LC,j0 ∈ RC)




|xmL − xjE1| − δ
¯ ¯xmL − xj0
¯ ¯¢
> 0 for every j0.
From claim 3 and δ < |xmL−xjE1|
|xmL−xj0| , the previous inequality is satisﬁed, hence by iterated deletion
of dominated strategies mL can be deleted.
Consider now set of candidates that have survived iterated deletion of dominated strategies. i.e.
j = jE1 , LC and RC. First note that the most extreme candidate in RC looses against any incumbent
j.I nf a c ti fj = jE1, we have established that j beats j0.I fj is the most extreme in LC, by symmetry
he wins. If j is any more centrist in LC, being closer the M again he wins. Hence, the most extreme
candidate in RC can be eliminated in the ﬁrst round of iterated elimination. Consider now the most
extreme candidate in LC. This candidate looses against the second most extreme in RC (i.e. the most
extreme in the set of candidates RC after the ﬁrst round of iterated elimination). On the other hand,
jE1 wins against any opponent and hence strictly dominates the most extreme candidate in the set
LC. Therefore, the most extreme candidate in LC can be eliminated in the second round of iterated
elimination. Applying the same logic in successive rounds, all the extreme candidates in the sets RC
and LC are eliminated. Finally, j0 = M is the only candidate of the opponent party that survives
iterated elimination. Given j0 = M,f r o mclaim 3 it follows that j = jE1 is the only candidate of the
opponent party that survives iterated elimination.
Assumption 2: |xmL − xmR| >
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ and |xmL − xM| ≤
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ and δ > |xmL−xjE1|
|xmL−xj0|
Under assumption 2, from the previous argument if follows that jE1 is strictly dominated by
mL. Therefore the candidates surviving iterated eliminations are mL, j ∈ LC and j0 ∈ RC.W h e n
δ >
|xmL−xj|
|xmL−xj0| ∀j ∈ LC,t h e nmL strictly dominates every j ∈ LC. Hence, party L runs mL that
chooses the high cost policy and is permanently replaced by the most extreme j0 ∈ RC.W h e n
|xmL−xj|
|xmL−xj0| < δ < |xmL−xM|
|xmL−xj0|, mL is strictly dominated by any j ∈ LC.O n c e mL is deleted, also
the most extreme j0 is strictly dominated by any other j0 ∈ RC. Hence, by elimination of strictly
dominated strategies in successive rounds, j = M and j0 = M are the only candidates surviving
iterated elimination.
Assumption 3: |xmL − xmR| ≤
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ




|xmL − xjE1| − δ
¯ ¯xmL − xj0
¯ ¯¢
< 0 for every j0, which means that j = jE1 and also
all the j more extreme than jE1 are strictly dominated by j = mL.N o t e a l s o t h a t a n y j0 ∈ RE is
defeated by j = mL and also by any j ∈ LC. Therefore, all j0 ∈ RE can be eliminated by iterated
deletion of strictly dominated locations. Hence, after the elimination of j ∈ LE and j0 ∈ RE,w ea r e
left with the following possible candidates:
(j = mL,j∈ LC,j 0 = mR,j0 ∈ RC)
Note that, j0 = mR is defeated by any remaining j. Hence, j = mR can be deleted. Once
34mR is deleted, j = mL is defeated by any remaining j0. However, since mL is the most preferred
location of the median party member mL, we obtain that j = mL strictly dominates any j ∈ LC when
δ >
|xmL−xj|
|xmL−xj0| ∀j ∈ LC. Hence, party L runs mL that chooses the high cost policy and is permanently
replaced by the most extreme j0 ∈ RC.W h e n
|xmL−xj|
|xmL−xj0| < δ < |xmL−xM|
|xmL−xj0|, mL is strictly dominated by
any j ∈ LC.O n c emL is deleted, also the most extreme j0 is strictly dominated by any other j0 ∈ RC.
Hence, by elimination of strictly dominated strategies in successive rounds, j = M and j0 = M are
the only candidates surviving iterated elimination.
Proposition 3
Let jC1 ∈ LC be the ﬁrst centrist candidate such that the following assumption is satisﬁed:
Assumption 4: |xM − xjC1| + CL <C H and |xjC1 − xM| ≥
B+δ(CH−CL)
δ and δ < |xmL−xjC1|
|xmL−xj0|
From proposition 2, candidates j ∈ LE and j0 ∈ RE can be eliminated. Given assumption 4, the
candidate mL is strictly dominated by jC1 and can therefore be eliminated. Also, jC1strictly dominates
any other j ∈ LC. Hence, jC1 is the only candidate of party L surviving iterated elimination. Note
that jC1 beats any remaining possible opponent. Hence, the median party member mR becomes
indiﬀerent amongst all candidates locations j0 = mR and j0 ∈ RC.
On the other hand, using proposition 2 we obtain that when δ >
|xmL−xj|
|xmL−xj0| ∀j ∈ LC,t h e nmL
strictly dominates every j ∈ LC. Hence, party L runs mL that chooses the high cost policy and is
permanently replaced by the most extreme j0 ∈ RC.W h e n
|xmL−xj|
|xmL−xj0| < δ < |xmL−xM|
|xmL−xj0|, mL is strictly
dominated by any j ∈ LC and also the most extreme j0 is strictly dominated by any other j0 ∈ RC.
Hence, by elimination of strictly dominated strategies in successive rounds, j = M and j0 = M are
the only candidates surviving iterated elimination.
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